



Even in a Pandemic, Sunlight Is the Best 
Disinfectant: COVID-19 and Global Freedom 
of Expression 
I. Misinformation Laws and Human Rights ................................. 2 
II. From a Public Health Crisis to a Human Rights Crisis ............. 6 
III. Protecting Speech in Times of Crisis ...................................... 10 
IV. Assessing Global Responses ................................................... 12 
V. Finding Solutions .................................................................... 14 
A. Narrowing and Clarifying the Prohibitions ..................... 14 
B. Positive Solutions ............................................................ 16 
Conclusion ......................................................................................... 20 
n times of war, the right to speak freely is often the first casualty.1 
As global leaders use the language of war to describe their efforts to 
stop COVID-19,2 an implication exists that, as in wartime, the current 
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1 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 
975 (1968). 
2 Caitlin Oprysko & Susannah Luthi, Trump Labels Himself ‘a Wartime President’ 
Combating Coronavirus, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020 
/03/18/trump-administration-self-swab-coronavirus-tests-135590; Xi Focus: Moment of 
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crisis demands exceptional limitations on freedom of expression. In the 
name of public health, governments around the world have enacted 
new policies targeting misinformation or increased enforcement of 
existing rules over the course of the pandemic.3 While the World Health 
Organization warns of an “infodemic” of fake news that “spreads 
faster and more easily than this virus,”4 human rights advocates express 
alarm at the effects of the accompanying crackdown on freedom of 
expression.5 
This Article discusses the global human rights implications of 
aggressive measures targeting the spread of COVID-19-related 
misinformation. Part I discusses the international human rights 
standards regarding misinformation. Part II explores various regulatory 
responses to misinformation about COVID-19, thus showing the 
impact on international human rights. Part III explores the applicability 
of international human rights law, specifically the standards for 
derogation in key human rights documents, to the current exceptional 
circumstances of COVID-19. Part IV assesses the regulatory responses 
against international human rights standards, finding significant cause 
for concern, particularly if these enforcement postures become 
normalized. Part V offers alternative solutions to the human rights 
challenges posed by health misinformation, particularly restrictions 
that are more carefully targeted and less open to abuse as well as 
transparency measures to promote trust and accountability in public 
institutions.  
I 
MISINFORMATION LAWS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Laws that prohibit the spread of misinformation raise a number of 
freedom of expression concerns. First, what constitutes misinformation 
Truth: Xi Leads War Against COVID-19, XINHUA (Mar. 10, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet 
.com/english/2020-03/10/c_138863611.htm [https://perma.cc/4HZ2-ET87]. 
3 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prot. of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression), Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Rep. of the U.N. Hum. Rts. Council on its Forty-Fourth Session, June 15–July 
3, 2020, ¶¶ 48–49, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (2020). 
4 UN Tackles ‘Infodemic’ of Misinformation and Cybercrime in COVID-19 Crisis, 
UNDGC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team 
/un-tackling-’infodemic’-misinformation-and-cybercrime-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/GE69 
-4LCR].
5 Asia: Bachelet Alarmed by Clampdown on Freedom of Expression During COVID-19,
U.N. HUM. RTS. (June 3, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display
News.aspx?NewsID=25920&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/72JA-N26J] [hereinafter Asia:
Bachelet Alarmed].
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can be difficult to define, even from a purely theoretical perspective.6 
In practical terms, the truth can be tricky to pin down.7 During a 
demonstration that results in violence, for example, the government’s 
position on what caused the escalation may be entirely different 
from that of the protesters.8 While, in some instances, one party’s 
position may be deliberately dishonest, in others, the competing 
parties’ perspectives may emphasize certain narrative aspects above 
others. In addition to the inherent challenges of finding a neutral and 
accurate account of the truth, defining what degree of deviation from 
the truth warrants prosecution can be difficult. Likewise, the common 
problem of separating statements of fact from expressions of opinion 
or perspective further blurs the line between lawful and prohibited 
speech.9 All of these challenges cut against a well-recognized principle 
of international human rights law: restrictions on speech must be 
drafted with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate their 
conduct accordingly and must be drafted with limited discretion related 
to the restriction’s execution.10 
Related to this lack of clarity, the unpredictable nature of 
misinformation offenses creates a heightened risk of a chilling effect 
on legitimate speech.11 The threat of severe penalty, particularly the 
threat of imprisonment, further exacerbates the risk of inhibiting 
6 Partly in response to the lack of definitional rigor in this space, Claire Wardle 
and Hossein Derakhshan have proposed a framework whereby “mis-information” is 
defined as information “that is false, but not created with the intention of causing harm.” 
Wardle and Derakhshan then use the term “information disorder” as a broader term that 
includes “mis-information,” “dis-information,” and “mal-information.” Claire Wardle & 
Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for 
Research and Policymaking, COUNCIL OF EUR., at 20–21 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://rm.coe 
.int/information-disorder-toward-aninterdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c. 
However, while this framework has gained significant academic traction, considerable 
variation remains regarding these terms’ common usage. Often, the terms are used 
interchangeably. See, e.g., Who Starts Viral Misinformation?, BBC NEWS (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-52454129 [https://perma.cc/3V5F-6P3Q]. 
7 Frank Deaver, On Defining Truth, 5 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 168, 169 (1990). 
8 See, e.g., Philip Bump, Attorney General Barr’s Dishonest Defense of the Clearing 
of Lafayette Square, WASH. POST (June 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/politics/2020/06/08/attorney-general-barrs-dishonest-defense-clearing-lafayette-square/ 
[https://perma.cc/T8TU-D5JX]. 
9 See, e.g., Rodney W. Ott, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative 
Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1990). 
10 Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of 
Opinion and Expression), ¶ 25, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011). 
11 See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49 (1979). 
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legitimate speech.12 The risk may have an especially concerning 
impact on journalism. Making occasional mistakes may be inevitable 
for journalists who frequently report on rapidly developing stories. In 
a robust democracy, criminal punishment is an unreasonable and 
disproportionate consequence for these unintentional mistakes. Instead, 
consequences should be limited to a journalist’s professional reputation 
and credibility. Where laws against misinformation exist, they are 
frequently abused as a mechanism to target journalists, as well as 
opposition commentators or other critics of the government.13  
As a consequence of these challenges, international human rights 
law has generally taken a skeptical view of criminal prohibitions 
targeting misinformation. In a 2017 Joint Declaration, freedom of 
expression mandates from the United Nations, the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) emphasized that “the human right to 
impart information and ideas is not limited to ‘correct statements.’”14 
This idea was reaffirmed in a 2020 declaration by special mandates 
from the U.N., the OAS, and the OSCE.15 The U.N. Human Rights 
Committee regularly cites abusive misinformation provisions in its 
reporting on national-level freedom of expression challenges.16 
There is relatively little international jurisprudence that specifically 
assesses the validity of misinformation laws, but some adverse findings 
exist where laws have been challenged. In 2018, the Community Court 
of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) found that The Gambia’s criminal restrictions targeting 
false news violated the freedom of expression protections in the 
12 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40984/07, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 102–03; 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-98401 (unpublished). 
13 See, e.g., Egypt: Activists Arrested in Dawn Raids, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13, 
2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/31/egypt-activists-arrested-dawn-raids [https:// 
perma.cc/5VEC-FUPZ]. 
14 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression, “Joint Declaration 
on Freedom of Expression and ‘Fake News,’ Disinformation and Propaganda” (Mar. 3, 
2017), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=1056&lID=1 [https: 
//perma.cc/4GKN-JML9]. 
15 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression, “Joint Declaration 
on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age,” CTR. FOR L. & DEMOCRACY 
(Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/mandates 
-decl.2020.elections.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4BB-5D8K].
16 See, e.g., Annual General Assembly Report of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 89,
U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Mauritius, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.60 (Apr. 4, 1996).
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Revised ECOWAS Treaty, as well as the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.17 Likewise in 2019, the East African Court of Justice 
invalidated sections of Tanzania’s Media Services Act related to false 
information dissemination.18 
A number of other courts have rejected false news laws as 
incompatible with constitutional freedom of expression guarantees. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Zundel19 held that a 
Criminal Code provision that prohibited willful publication of a 
statement or news that the publisher knows is false and that “causes 
or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest” was 
incompatible with the country’s constitutional freedom of speech 
protections. The Supreme Court grounded its reasoning in the potential 
breadth of the prohibition. The 1992 decision also labeled the provision 
“anachronistic,” which is particularly interesting in the context of the 
current resurgence of global interest in these laws. The Supreme Court 
of Canada’s reasoning in Zundel was particularly influential elsewhere 
in the Commonwealth,20 and successful constitutional challenges 
against false news laws in Uganda,21 Zimbabwe,22 and Zambia23 all 
cited the Zundel decision in their reasoning. The United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Alvarez, which held that the First 
Amendment protects false statements of fact, makes it highly unlikely 
that a misinformation law would survive constitutional challenge in the 
United States.24 Likewise, in Hector v. Attorney-General of Antigua 
and Barbuda, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found that 
17 ECOWAS: Federation of African Journalists (FAJ) et al. v. The Gambia, Judgment 
No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/04/18, p. 61. 
18 EACJ: Media Council of Tanzania et al. v. the Attorney General of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, Reference No. 2 of 2017 p.49. However, there is some ambiguity to 
this decision, since the Court invalidated the provisions despite also claiming that they 
appear to be “largely unobjectionable.” Id.  
19 R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.). 
20 Id. 
21 Onyango-Obbo and Mwenda v. The Attorney General of Uganda, Constitutional 
Appeal No. 2 of 2002 (11 February 2004). 
22 Chavunduka and Choto v. Minister of Home Affairs & Attorney General of 
Zimbabwe, (May 22, 2000), Judgment No. S.C. 36/2000 (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe). 
23 Chipenzi and Others v. The People, (HPR/03/2014) [2014] ZMHC 112, at J23–J25 
(Dec. 3, 2014). 
24 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
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Antigua and Barbuda’s law against making false statements violated 
freedom of expression protections in that country’s constitution.25  
Although the limited amount of international jurisprudence makes it 
difficult to come to a categorical conclusion that misinformation laws 
are always illegitimate, the preceding examples illustrate that 
legislation in this space can raise freedom of expression concerns. 
Concerns about the vague nature of these laws, and the potential for 
collateral damage to journalism or other forms of legitimate speech, 
seem to be a recurring theme in debates around criminal laws targeting 
misinformation.  
II 
FROM A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS TO A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 
Although debates around the impact the internet has as a vector for 
misinformation have been ongoing for years,26 the current crisis has 
made governments particularly jittery of potential dangers. In the 
United Kingdom, conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 is 
somehow connected to the rollout of 5G mobile service have led to 
arson of cell towers.27 Other rumors include rumors the United States 
or Chinese military originally spread the virus for use as a bioweapon,28 
or that the virus can be cured by avoiding ice cream or even drinking 
bleach.29 More broadly, the pandemic has created a heightened need for 
people to strictly regulate their behavior, such as mask-wearing and 
social distancing protocols.30 False narratives that muddy the message 
25 Hector v. Attorney-General of Antigua and Barbuda, [1990] UKPC 3, at 6. 
26 See, e.g., Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, Common-Knowledge Attacks on 
Democracy, SSRN (Nov. 17, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3273111 [https://perma.cc/2D78-7CTJ]. 
27 Mast Fire Probe Amid 5G Coronavirus Claims, BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-52164358 [https://perma.cc/8EY2-RGME]. 
28 Carlton Reid, Chinese State Newspaper Amplifies Conspiracy Theory That First 
COVID-19 Patient Was U.S. Cyclist, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.forbes.com 
/sites/carltonreid/2020/03/26/chinese-state-newspaper-stokes-conspiracy-theory-that-first 
-covid-19-patient-was-us-cyclist/#1467c66728dd [https://perma.cc/GT3B-8UP4]; Bill Gertz,
Coronavirus May Have Originated in Lab Linked to China’s Biowarfare Program, WASH.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/26/coronavirus
-link-to-china-biowarfare-program-possi/ [https://perma.cc/KC53-X7SV].
29 Zaria Gorvett, No, Drinking Water Doesn’t Kill Coronavirus, BBC FUTURE (Mar. 20,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200319-covid-19-will-drinking-water-keep
-you-safe-from-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/GTP3-CHV2].
30 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Noah Weiland, Fauci, Citing ‘Disturbing Surge,’ Tells
Congress the Virus Is Not Under Control, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/fauci-congress-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/5K34-G29Z].
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around proper safety protocols, or sow distrust in public institutions, 
may be more dangerous than usual during the current crisis. 
However, while some fears of misinformation in the current context 
are well placed, the pandemic has given rise to an unprecedented global 
crackdown on freedom of expression. Both Hungary and Thailand now 
punish the spread of “false information” about the virus or measures 
against it with up to five years’ imprisonment.31 In Zimbabwe, the 
penalty is up to twenty years’ imprisonment.32 New laws criminalizing 
COVID-19–related misinformation have also been passed in Algeria,33 
Namibia,34 and at the state level in India.35 Some new laws aimed at 
controlling information flows, like Botswana’s Emergency Powers 
(COVID-19) Regulations, 2020, go even further—they criminalize 
sharing any information about the COVID-19 pandemic from a source 
other than the Director of Health Services or the World Health 
Organization.36 As of June 2020, Botswana had charged at least two 
31 See Hungary Passes Law Allowing Viktor Orban to Rule by Decree, DEUTSCHE  
WELLE (Mar. 30, 2020),  https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-passes-law-allowing-viktor 
-orban-to-rule-by-decree/a-52956243 [https://perma.cc/QV83-ZEP6]; Thailand: COVID-
19 Clampdown on Free Speech, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2020/03/25/thailand-covid-19-clampdown-free-speech [https://perma.cc/AU7W
-HKKA].
32 Public Health (COVID-19 Prevention, Containment and Treatment) (National




33 Melissa Nait Ali, Ce que prévoit l’amendement du code pénal sur les Fake-News et 
violation du confinement, INTERLIGNES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.inter-lignes.com/ce 
-que-prevoit-lamendement-du-code-penal-sur-les-fake-news-et-violation-du-confinement/;
Algeria Blocks 3 News Websites and Criminalizes False News, COMM. TO PROTECT 
JOURNALISTS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://cpj.org/2020/04/algeria-blocks-3-news-websites-and
-criminalizes-fa/ [https://perma.cc/7DTN-UYV9].
34 Republic of Namibia, Amendment of State of Emergency COVID-19 Regulations:
Namibian Constitution (Proclamation No. 13 of 2020), s. 15(1)(e), http://www.lac.org.na
/laws/2020/7180.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6PP-PT5K].
35 Government of Punjab, India, Punjab Epidemic Diseases, COVID-19 Regulations,
2020 (No. 14/7/2020-4Pb4/677), s. 6; Government of Maharashtra, India, The Maharashtra
COVID-19 Regulations, 2020 (No. Corona-2020/CR-58/Aarogya-5), s. 6, https://www
.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/Acts%20Rules/English/Korona%20Notification%2014
%20March%202020....pdf [https://perma.cc/TBL3-39D9]; Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi, India, Delhi Epidemic Diseases, COVID-19 Regulations, 2020 (No. F.
51/DGHS/PH-IV/COVID-19/ 202-215), s. 6, https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/cir/covid19_1403
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5NL-GAAQ].
36 Republic of Botswana, Emergency Powers (COVID-19) Regulations, 2020 (Statutory
Instrument No. 61 of 2020), s. 30(3), https://bw.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites
/125/Emergency-Powers-COVID-19-Regulations-2020.pdf.
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journalists and one opposition politician under the law.37 Armenia’s 
emergency declaration contains a similar provision, which has likewise 
been used to target journalists.38 
Other countries have used the current crisis as an excuse to ramp up 
prosecutions of journalists and opposition political figures under 
existing false news laws. Bangladesh has filed at least 60 cases against 
more than 100 people under the false news provisions of its Digital 
Security Act, including 22 journalists and a number of social activists 
and whistleblowers.39 Cambodia has arrested over 20 people, many of 
them associated with a dissolved opposition party.40 Venezuela has 
detained at least 18 journalists since the start of the pandemic, many 
under the accusation of incitement of hatred.41 In Côte d’Ivoire, a civil 
court fined a newspaper under Article 173 of the Criminal Code, which 
prohibits publishing “false information likely to cause panic,” after 
journalists reported on the arrest of two people infected with COVID-
19.42 Journalists have also been arrested in Chad,43 Iran,44 Myanmar,45 
37 Sesupo Rantsimako, BPF Spokesman Arrested for Fake News, THE BOTS. GAZETTE 
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.thegazette.news/news/bpf-spokesman-arrested-for-fake-news 
/30891/#.XtgXsy2Q1p8 [https://perma.cc/AXQ2-6ACB]; Portia Mlilo, Justice Motlhabane 
Case Postponed to Tuesday, THE VOICE (Aug. 2, 2020), https://news.thevoicebw.com 
/2020/08/justice-motlhabane-case-postponed-to-Tuesday/ [https://perma.cc/TZA5-TJXJ]. 
38 Ani Mejlumyan, Armenia Takes Hard Line Against Media Reporting on COVID-19, 
EURASIANET (Mar. 23, 2020), https://eurasianet.org/armenia-takes-hard-line-against-media 
-reporting-on-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/JEC2-42PD].
39 Ali Riaz, A Pandemic of Persecution in Bangladesh, ATL. COUNCIL (May 11,
2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-pandemic-of-persecution-in
-bangladesh/.
40 Cambodia: Reporter Jailed for Quoting Hun Sen on COVID-19, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/10/cambodia-reporter-jailed-quoting
-hun-sen-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/T8UD-E7FS].
41 Coronavirus en Venezuela: los periodistas y médicos detenidos en el país en medio
de la pandemia, BBC NEWS (Apr 28, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america
-latina-52450803/ [https://perma.cc/7WKP-CDH5].
42 Newspaper Fined for “False Publication” on COVID-19 Status of Inmates,
MEDIA FOUND. FOR W. AFR. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.mfwa.org/issues-in-focus
/newspaper-fined-for-false-publication-about-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/FJ2H-C6UC].
43 Chadian Police Attack TV Crew Covering Coronavirus Measures, REPS. WITHOUT
BORDERS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://rsf.org/en/news/chadian-police-attack-tv-crew-covering
-coronavirus-measures [https://perma.cc/3D8G-VC7B].
44 Iranian Journalists Hounded for Disputing Official Coronavirus Figures, REPS.
WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://rsf.org/en/news/iranian-journalists-hounded
-disputing-official-coronavirus-figures [https://perma.cc/YQ9U-AJHA].
45 Myanmar Journalist Jailed for Two Years for Reporting COVID-19 Death, REPS.
WITHOUT BORDERS (May 25, 2020), https://rsf.org/en/news/myanmar-journalist-jailed
-two-years-reporting-covid-19-death [https://perma.cc/45TP-LU9M].
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the Philippines,46 and Egypt,47 the last of which has a particularly 
extensive record of abusing false news laws to target critical voices. A 
number of cases stemmed from reports that uncovered governmental 
malfeasance or negligence, such as officials refusing to obey 
quarantine orders48 or systemic underreporting of COVID-19 infection 
and death rates.49 In addition to false news legislation, governments 
have cracked down on alleged virus misinformation using laws 
prohibiting hate speech,50 public intimidation,51 and, in the case of 
India, the colonial-era Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897.52 
Still, other governments have expanded their control over the 
information discourse in different ways. Romania’s state of emergency 
proclamation does not include jail terms, but does grant the government 
sweeping powers to order that false material be removed from public 
view.53 Governments in Nepal and Myanmar have ordered 
telecommunications providers to block news websites accused of 
46 Two Reporters Charged for Spreading ‘False Information’ About COVID-19 in the 
Philippines, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://cpj.org/2020/04 
/two-reporters-charged-for-spreading-false-informat.php [https://perma.cc/7DJ8-2YAA]; 
See Statement on Government Requiring Journalists to Get PCOO Accreditation to Be 
Exempted from Community Quarantine, CTR. FOR MEDIA FREEDOM & RESP. (Mar. 
20, 2020), https://cmfr-phil.org/statements/statement-on-government-requiring-journalists 
-to-get-pcoo-accreditation-to-be-exempted-from-community-quarantine/ [https://perma.cc
/SC78-527P].
47 Qassem Mohammed, Egypt Arrests 10 Journalists Since Coronavirus Outbreak, 
ANADOLU AGENCY (May 22, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/egypt-arrests-10 
-journalists-since-coronavirus-outbreak/1850942 [https://perma.cc/P3FU-E8UQ].
48 See, e.g., Mary Wambui, Police Hold Blogger Nyakundi over COVID-19 Twitter Post,
DAILY NATION (March 27, 2020), https://nation.africa/kenya/news/police-hold-blogger
-nyakundi-over-covid-19-twitter-post-281064 [https://perma.cc/C5GA-P8PH].
49 REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 44.
50 Detienen a hombre por el delito de actos de odio en Guayaquil, METRO ECUADOR
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.metroecuador.com.ec/ec/noticias/2020/04/06/detienen-hombre
-comentarios-negativos-redes-sociales-guayaquil.html [https://perma.cc/XNY6-3SZ7].
51 See Coronavirus en la Argentina: “Voy a contagiarlos a todos”, el video de un
santafesino que terminó en denuncia, LA NACION (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www
.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/coronavirus-argentina-voy-contagiarlos-todos-video-santafesino
-nid2347405 [https://perma.cc/XD79-3G2N].
52 Republic of India, Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (Act. No. 3 of 1897).
53 Marcel Gascón Barberá, Romania’s State of Emergency Raises Media Freedom
Concerns, BALKAN INSIGHT (Mar. 31, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/31
/romanias-state-of-emergency-raises-media-freedom-concerns/.
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hosting misinformation.54 Jordan even suspended the printing of 
newspapers, alleging that the printing process could spread the virus.55 
While it is easy to recognize the potential harm from health 
misinformation in the current context, these examples demonstrate how 
broadly worded laws aimed at preventing the spread of conspiracy 
theories can be repurposed to blunt critical reporting, opposition 
speech, whistleblowing, or even accurate observations of how state 
agencies are mismanaging the crisis. Governments around the world 
are treating the pandemic as a blank check to crack down on dissent, 
with the potential for a lasting shift in how freedom of expression is 
understood and protected.56  
III 
PROTECTING SPEECH IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
Periods of exceptional societal stress commonly affect our collective 
calculus in determining what kinds of human rights restrictions are 
justified.57 However, temporary measures adopted in times of crisis 
often become normal.58 This is partly because people become inured to 
the new rules, or another potential emergency is always around the 
corner, which may counter attempts to ease restrictions.59  
The current COVID-19 pandemic presents difficult trade-offs 
between safeguarding the right to freedom of expression and protecting 
public health.60 In considering the applicability of international human 
rights law to these exceptional circumstances, it is useful to refer back 
to the standards spelled out in key human rights documents for 
54 Thompson Chau, Telenor Follows Myanmar Orders to Block Alleged ‘Fake News’ 
Sites, MYANMAR TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.mmtimes.com/news/telenor-follows 
-myanmar-orders-block-alleged-fake-news-sites.html; Press Release, Press Council of
Nepal, Notice for Media’s Attention and Action (Mar. 30, 2020), http://www.presscouncil
nepal.org/np/2020/03/2771.
55 Middle East Governments Clamp Down on Coronavirus Coverage, REPS. WITHOUT 
BORDERS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://rsf.org/en/news/middle-east-governments-clamp-down 
-coronavirus-coverage.
56 Richard Burchill, When Does an Emergency Threaten the Life of the Nation?
Derogations from Human Rights Obligations and the War on International Terrorism,
8 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 99, 115 (2005).
57 Emerson, supra note 1. 
58 Burchill, supra note 56. 
59 See Kim L. Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the 
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004). 
60 Kaye, supra note 3, ¶¶ 15−16. 
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derogating from the scope of obligations.61 The most well known of 
these is in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),62 which allows governments facing a public 
emergency that “threatens the life of the nation” to take measures that, 
under normal circumstances, would violate certain human rights 
obligations.63 The underlying caveats include that the government must 
properly declare the emergency and the intent to derogate, must clearly 
define an end point for the exceptional measures, and must justify the 
measures as “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”64 The 
ICCPR further mandates that governments wishing to avail themselves 
of this option must inform the U.N. Secretary-General of this desire 
and the date the derogation terminates.65 Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights66 and Article 27 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights include similar processes.67  
As of September 2020, a search of the United Nations Treaty 
Collection shows that twenty-one countries notified the U.N. 
Secretary-General of an intent to restrict the applicability of certain 
provisions of the ICCPR under the Article 4 framework as a result of 
COVID-19.68 Only one of these countries, Colombia, targeted their 
notification toward the Article 19 protection of freedom of expression, 
which limits the formal applicability of this process to the policies 
discussed in Part II.69 Nonetheless, the general formula that these 




64 For an extensive discussion of the contours of justified derogations from human rights 
norms in times of emergency, see U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), The 
Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogation Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex, (Sept. 28, 1984). 
65 Id. at 11. 
66 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 
1953). 
67 See American Convention on Human Rights, T.S. 36, Nov. 22, 1969, (entered into 
force July 18, 1978). 
68 The countries that have invoked COVID-19 to trigger an emergency declaration under 
the ICCPR are Guatemala, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Ecuador, Romania, Peru, Georgia, 
Palestine, Chile, Kyrgyzstan, El Salvador, San Marino, Moldova, Argentina, Thailand, 
Ethiopia, Senegal, Namibia, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic. The full database of 
depositary notifications is available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/CNs.aspx?cnTab=tab2& 
clang=_en. 
69 U.N. Secretary-General, Depositary Notification (Mar. 25, 2020), https://treaties.un 
.org/doc/Publication/CN/2020/CN.131.2020-Eng.pdf. 
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documents apply is useful to understanding and interpreting 
international human rights standards in the context of an emergency. In 
essence, the ICCPR standard of “strict necessity” may be viewed as a 
narrower formulation of the traditional three-part test for restrictions on 
speech, mandating that the exigencies of the situation require the 
intrusions and are proportional to the danger, both in terms of their 
degree and their duration.70 
IV 
ASSESSING GLOBAL RESPONSES 
As assessed against the standards spelled out in the preceding parts,71 
international mechanisms are justified in expressing concern with the 
crackdown.72 First, while some of the revised laws spelled out in this 
Article are explicitly temporary in their application,73 this is not always 
the case.74 For example, while most of the provisions in Zimbabwe’s 
emergency order are explicitly limited to the period corresponding to 
the national lockdown, the restrictions on “false reporting” have no 
such sunset.75 Concerns that the impacts of COVID responses could 
outlast the current pandemic compound in cases where misinformation 
enforcement is based not on COVID-related legislation but on a newly 
expansive interpretation of laws that were already on the books.76 
Given the documented abuses of these laws to target journalists and 
70 UNCHR, supra note 64. 
71 See supra Part I, Part III. 
72 Asia: Bachelet Alarmed, supra note 5; IACHR and Its SR FOE Express Concern 
About Restrictions on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in States’ 
Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Press Release R78/20 (Apr. 18, 2020), http://www 
.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=1173&lID=1 [https://perma.cc/Q7MD 
-9AJT]; Kaye, supra note 3, ¶¶ 48–49.
73 See, e.g., Republic of Namibia, Amendment of State of Emergency COVID-19
Regulations: Namibian Constitution (Proclamation No. 13 of 2020), s. 15(1)(e), http://www
.lac.org.na/laws/2020/7180.pdf.
74 Public Health (COVID-19 Prevention, Containment and Treatment) (National





76 Bhavya Dore, Fake News, Real Arrests, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 17, 2020), https:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/17/fake-news-real-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/LAL6-DLEH]. See 
also Detienen a hombre por el delito de actos de odio en Guayaquil, supra note 50; See also 
Coronavirus en la Argentina: “Voy a contagiarlos a todos”, el video de un santafesino que 
terminó en denuncia, supra note 51. 
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other critical voices, normalizing this approach to combating false 
speech would be disastrous for global freedom of expression.77 
Second, many of the restrictions are framed in extremely broad 
terms beyond the narrow confines of information likely to cause actual 
harm.78 A particularly extreme example involves laws criminalizing 
statements that diverge in any way from the official government line, 
effectively granting authorities the power to enforce their own 
centralized version of the truth.79 Key defenses that would prevent an 
undue chilling effect, such as allowing a defendant to demonstrate their 
honest but mistaken belief that the content was correct, are generally 
absent from the laws discussed in this Article.80 
Third, disproportionate sanctions are another common feature of the 
crackdown.81 In 2000, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression stated in clear terms that, with the exception of cases 
involving racist or discriminatory comments or calls to violence, 
“imprisonment as punishment for the peaceful expression of an opinion 
constitutes a serious violation of human rights.”82 Even in an 
emergency, it seems doubtful that multiyear jail terms could possibly 
be considered necessary or proportionate.  
This analysis paints a picture of a regressive environment for global 
freedom of expression; an environment that seems likely to persist 
as the pandemic drags on and could even affect global freedom 
of expression norms beyond the current crisis.83 Given freedom 
of expression’s importance as a core democratic right, and in the 
77 Supra Part II. 
78 See, e.g., Thailand: COVID-19 Clampdown on Free Speech, supra note 31; Ani 
Mejlumyan, supra note 31. 
79 Republic of Botswana, Emergency Powers (Covid-19) Regulations, 2020 (Statutory 
Instrument No. 61 of 2020), s. 30(3), https://bw.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites 
/125/Emergency-Powers-COVID-19-Regulations-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAJ7-P5Z2]. 
80 See, e.g., Republic of Namibia, Amendment Of State Of Emergency Covid-19 
Regulations: Namibian Constitution (Proclamation No. 13 of 2020), s. 15(1)(e), http://www 
.lac.org.na/laws/2020/7180.pdf.  
81 See Hungary Passes Law Allowing Viktor Orban to Rule by Decree, supra note 31; 
see also Thailand: COVID-19 Clampdown on Free Speech, supra note 31. 
82 Annual Report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 18 January 2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4 
/2000/63, ¶ 205. 
83 See Siobhan Roberts, This Is the Future of the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/health/coronavirus-pandemic-curve-scenarios.html 
[https://perma.cc/KP7P-WVQR]. 
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context of a broader regression of global democratic values,84 
considering alternative solutions to COVID-19’s misinformation 
challenges is important. 
V  
FINDING SOLUTIONS 
Although the current backsliding on freedom of expression is 
concerning, health misinformation unquestionably poses a real risk in 
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.85 As a result, critiques of the 
impact of governmental approaches to countering this “infodemic” 
give rise to a need for careful analysis as to how governments can 
safeguard their populations in a way that is less intrusive against core 
human rights. This Part considers two general options for mitigating 
the harm of governmental responses. The first is to narrow and clarify 
the scope of criminal content rules targeting misinformation. The 
second is to focus efforts toward increasing the quality and accuracy of 
the discourse. 
A. Narrowing and Clarifying the Prohibitions
It is worth recalling that a cardinal rule of human rights law is that 
restrictions affecting the right to freedom of expression should be 
as carefully targeted as possible.86 Given that overbreadth is one of the 
most common problems noted in Part IV of this Article, it stands to 
reason that more carefully tailored restrictions would go some way 
toward mitigating the harm to freedom of expression. In this vein, 
although there are often grave concerns associated with laws 
criminalizing misinformation, certain narrow and specific versions 
of these prohibitions have survived judicial scrutiny. In particular, 
courts have repeatedly upheld laws criminalizing Holocaust denial.87 
Similarly, in Faurisson v. France, the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
84 See Michael J. Abramowitz, Democracy in Crisis, FREEDOM HOUSE (2018), https:// 
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis [https://perma.cc/6X2S 
-P3B8].
85 See U.N. Tackles ‘Infodemic’ of Misinformation and Cybercrime in COVID-19 Crisis,
UNDGC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team
/un-tackling-’infodemic’-misinformation-and-cybercrime-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/J53B
-28KP].
86 Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 10, ¶ 25.
87 See Pastörs v. Germany, 2019 Eur. Ct. H.R. 330, https://laweuro.com/?p=9877 
[https://perma.cc/PC7V-S5B5]. 
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upheld a French law that prohibited denying crimes against humanity 
because of the specific nexus with anti-Semitism.88  
A key difference between the laws targeting Holocaust denial and 
the responses to COVID-19 outlined in the preceding parts concerns 
the breadth of prohibited content. This principle also relates to the 
ICCPR standard that emergency interferences should be “strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.”89 A narrower and more 
specifically defined law naturally carries a lower probability of being 
misused or of creating a problematic chilling effect around legitimate 
speech.90 
As applied to the current context, narrowing the scope of restrictions 
targeting COVID-19–related misinformation could mean only 
prohibiting statements that are likely to directly compromise treatment 
or public health efforts, such as peddling claims about a fraudulent cure 
or actively attempting to subvert public health protocols.  
Constructing the offense along these lines also keeps cases focused 
on objectively verifiable areas of the discourse, such as the efficacy of 
a particular drug. The relatively narrow band of speech that such an 
offense might target also mitigates the harm from governments 
effectively centralizing their own version of the truth. Likewise, this 
framing mitigates the potential for a harmful chilling effect, since such 
a formulation would leave out policy criticisms of official responses to 
the crisis. This is also consistent with the Human Rights Committee’s 
position that governments should never curtail freedom of opinion, 
even during a state of emergency.91  
While narrowing the scope of content restrictions would help to 
mitigate their potential collateral damage, this approach still faces 
technical challenges to its implementation as a solution to the 
misinformation problem. Ever since the spread of the internet as a 
primary avenue for popular discourse, governments have faced a 
constant struggle to enforce content rules in the online space.92 This is 
88 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Robert Faurisson v. France, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D 
/550/1993 (Dec. 16, 1996), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/VWS55058.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/3JGQ-WQXV]. 
89 UNCHR, supra note 64, at 5. 
90 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49 (1979). 
91 See Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 10, ¶¶ 5, 11. 
92 The ongoing struggles to enforce copyright over the past two decades are a good 
example of this challenge, though similar problems persist across nearly every other 
type of prohibited content. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement 
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partly due to the enormous volumes of speech that flow across the 
internet every day, as well as the technical challenges in tracing 
information back to its source.93 While governments may use criminal 
content restrictions to target particularly egregious or harmful cases, it 
seems doubtful that they can ever be enforced with sufficient resources 
to make a dent in the broader problem. In other words, the problem 
with criminal restrictions targeting misinformation is not merely that 
the restrictions can have an outsized impact on legitimate speech. 
Rather, the problem is that their scope for positively affecting the 
discourse is limited. Given the well-documented challenges of 
enforcing content online, even against clearly defined harms like child 
sexual abuse material,94 the broader efficacy of the criminal law as a 
mechanism to stamp out misinformation is dubious. Such efforts will 
also do little to stem the tide of false information that senior officials 
are perpetrating.95 Rather than focusing on negative efforts to restrict 
harmful speech, positive efforts to improve the visibility and quality of 
the information discourse are a more promising avenue of engagement. 
B. Positive Solutions
In order to promote quality and trust in the information discourse, a 
better solution than seeking to stem the flow of misleading information 
is to increase the dissemination of accurate and high-quality 
information. While it may sound trite to suggest that the best answer to 
bad speech is more speech, such an idea takes on a renewed import 
during a public health crisis, given the importance of both public trust 
Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695 (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1739970 [https://perma.cc/4FHJ-W85F]; Jennifer Stewart, If This Is the 
Global Community, We Must Be on the Bad Side of Town: International Policing of Child 
Pornography on the Internet, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L LAW 205, 211 (1997), https://heinonline 
.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hujil20&div=11&id=&page=&collection=journal
s [https://perma.cc/2YMM-J9CP]. 
93 See Chengcheng Shao et al., The Spread of Low-Credibility Content by Social Bots, 
9 NATURE COMMC’NS 1 (2018).  
94 Stewart, supra note 92. 
95 See, e.g., Kurt Wagner, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube Remove Posts From Bolsonaro, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-31 
/facebook-twitter-pull-misleading-posts-from-brazil-s-bolsonaro [https://perma.cc/YG6E 
-6WMT]; see Kim Lyons, Twitter Removes Tweets by Brazil, Venezuela Presidents for
Violating COVID-19 Content Rules, THE VERGE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.theverge
.com/2020/3/30/21199845/twitter-tweets-brazil-venezuela-presidents-covid-19-corona
virus-jair-bolsonaro-maduro [https://perma.cc/S46G-PWLS]; see Rebecca Shabad, Twitter
Removes Tweet Highlighted by Trump Falsely Claiming COVID-19 ‘Cure,’ NBC NEWS
(July 28, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/twitter-removes-tweet
-highlighted-trump-falsely-claiming-covid-cure-n1235075 [https://perma.cc/U2PP-PBLU].
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and accountability.96 There are two basic components to a positive 
response to misinformation. The first is to promote the dissemination 
of quality and trustworthy information, particularly from official 
sources. The second is to ensure that positive speakers have the 
resources and support to counter misinformation.  
State efforts promoting quality and trustworthy information must 
begin with a strong commitment to transparency. While it is 
understandable that governments might want to exert more control 
over information flows in times of crisis, such instincts are 
counterproductive. Rumor and misinformation thrive in an 
environment of secrecy. Conversely, an open and expressive 
environment fosters public trust in institutions.97 This is true even 
where transparency exposes corruption or mismanagement.98 While 
such revelations can be damaging to institutional reputations in the 
short term, they ultimately benefit public confidence insofar as they 
help to identify and resolve these problems. Certainly, a context in 
which institutional challenges are openly confronted is more conducive 
to public trust than one where they are covered up.99 
Freedom of information, right to information, or access to 
information legislation are particularly vital mechanisms for ensuring 
a steady and reliable flow of information to the public. Governments 
under pressure should aim to bolster these systems as a way of 
promoting public trust.100 Unfortunately, under the current pandemic 
the opposite trend appears present; some governments have suspended 
the application of transparency rules, particularly the right to file 
information requests.101 In Honduras and Bangladesh, for example, 
oversight bodies suspended appeals processes regarding right to 
96 See Whitney v. California, 274 US 357 (1927), https://supreme.justia.com/cases 
/federal/us/274/357/ [https://perma.cc/D84F-ETSE]. 
97 Kaye, supra note 3, ¶ 18. 
98 Id. ¶ 31. 
99 Id. ¶ 18. 
100 See Maintaining Human Rights During Health Emergencies: Brief on Standards 
Regarding the Right to Information, CTR. FOR L. & DEMOCRACY 20 (May 27, 2020), https:// 
www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/RTI-and-COVID-19-Briefing 
.20-05-27.Final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8EM-N8UC]. 
101 See COVID-19 Tracker, CTR. FOR L. & DEMOCRACY & ACCESS INFO EUROPE (Apr. 
6, 2020), https://www.rti-rating.org/covid-19-tracker/. 
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information requests, effectively removing any recourse for wrongfully 
denied or delayed responses.102  
While, in some cases, government agencies frame the suspensions 
as part of a broader government shutdown of public-facing operations, 
in other instances government agencies appear to be using the 
pandemic as an excuse to deprioritize their transparency obligations.103 
In mid-March, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced that they 
were suspending their online freedom of information requesting portal 
and would only process requests received by regular mail.104 The shift 
away from digital requests and toward mail requests requires staffers 
to physically receive items, which seems difficult to justify in the 
context of a global shift toward remote work. Certainly, the shift 
appears to run counter to directives being issued across the United 
States for citizens to avoid unnecessarily leaving their homes.105 
Obviously, there will be certain processes that governments are 
unable to carry out during the pandemic, such as where offices are 
completely closed and records are inaccessible remotely. However, 
working to bridge these gaps should be a priority in order to ensure that 
traditional record keeping and open data standards are maintained in 
the COVID-19 era, particularly in areas of operation related to the 
government’s response to the crisis.  
At a time when public trust is vital to an effective pandemic 
response, governments should view responding to information requests 
as an obligation that should be prioritized. Rather than seeing freedom 
of expression and the right to information as values that compete 
against measures to combat COVID-19, governments should recognize 
the core roles that transparency and accountability play in maintaining 
102 Shamsul Bari & Ruhi Naz, RTI/FOI Acts: Another Victim of the COVID-19 
Pandemic, THE DAILY STAR (May 15, 2020), https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion 
/news/rtifoi-acts-another-victim-the-covid-19-pandemic-1902607 [https://perma.cc/GW2F 
-C3D9]; Honduras, Communication, INST. OF ACCESS TO PUB. INFO. (Mar. 29, 2020),
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EUVCoAjWsAAv4gX?format=jpg&name=medium [https://
perma.cc/8CHU-P68S].
103 For example, in March, Hawaii suspended the application of its Uniform 
Information Practices Act entirely. Supplementary Emergency Proclamation of Mar. 16, 
2020, https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2003109-ATG_COVID-19 
-Supplementary-Proclamation-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXX8-AWD7].
104 See Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Processing Changes Due to COVID-19:
In Brief, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R46292.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GY3D-23WP].
105 Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu & Vanessa Swales, See Which States and Cities Have
Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html [https://perma.cc/9KBN-YMK5].
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public confidence. As Glenn Cohen, a bioethics expert at Harvard Law 
School, noted, “Public health depends a lot on public trust. If the public 
feels as though they are being misled or misinformed their willingness 
to make sacrifices—in this case social distancing—is reduced.”106 
Operations that seek to build media literacy, or otherwise empower 
actors such as journalists or fact-checking organizations, are also 
valuable, proactive solutions to combat misinformation. Studies show 
that building media literacy is a key component to promoting popular 
resilience against misinformation.107 While these solutions tend to be 
longer term and structural, and therefore more difficult to deploy in the 
context of a sudden crisis, there have been some moves to 
operationalize more rapid responses to the spread of misinformation. 
The CivActs campaign (a global movement that works to counter 
misinformation through coordinating responses from journalists and 
civil society) is particularly noteworthy in this regard; CivActs 
currently runs campaigns to counter COVID-related misinformation in 
Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger.108 However, 
initiatives like CivActs require a robust civil society environment in 
which to operate, including the sorts of human rights protections that 
are at risk as a consequence of the proliferation of vague and repressive 
anti-misinformation laws. In other words, measures that crackdown on 
freedom of expression are not only problematic in their own right 
but also could serve to close off potential positive responses to 
misinformation. 
In April 2020, the U.N. Human Rights Committee reminded parties 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of their 
obligation to avoid derogating from the applicability of certain rights, 
including the right to freedom of expression, where other measures 
were available to achieve their public policy objectives.109 Likewise, 
the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
106 Thomas Fuller, How Much Should the Public Know About Who Has the 
Coronavirus?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us 
/coronavirus-data-privacy.html. 
107 See Marin Lessenski, Just Think About It. Findings of the Media Literacy Index 
2019, OPEN SOC’Y INST. SOFIA (Nov. 2019), https://osis.bg/wp-content/uploads/2019/11 
/MediaLiteracyIndex2019_-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF2N-H853]. 
108 Coronavirus CivActs Campaign, CIVACTS, https://civacts.org/civactscampaign/ 
[https://perma.cc/C7H4-ML65] (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
109 See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Statement on Derogations from the Covenant in 
Connection with the COVID-19 Pandemic, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/128/2 (2020), at ¶ 2(c), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/COVIDstatementEN.pdf. 
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emphasized the importance of public participation in public health 
conversations and initiatives, and warned against governments seeking 
to crack down on discussions in this space.110 While none of the 
solutions offered in this section are a panacea, they present avenues to 
countering misinformation that are more likely to have an impact than 
a heavy-handed crackdown on speech—without the harmful 
consequences to core democratic values.  
CONCLUSION 
Although harm to freedom of expression has not been the most 
dramatic impact of the current pandemic, the global shift away from 
international human rights standards may turn out to be one of its most 
pernicious and lasting legacies. This conceptual shift accompanies an 
increasingly common narrative regarding the supposed superiority of 
closed or repressive systems of government in responding to the 
pandemic.111 This perspective relies on a highly selective view of the 
global landscape that ignores, for example, atrocious failures to contain 
the virus in Iran.112 Some have even pointed to China as an example of 
the benefits of mechanisms of tight social control, even though these 
restrictions have, at best, been a double-edged sword.113 For example, 
Li Wenliang, the Wuhan doctor whom the government has now 
lionized for his early attempts to sound an alarm about the virus, was 
originally arrested for his actions.114  
110 See U.N. Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The Right 
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (2000), ¶ 34. 
111 See, e.g., Philip J. Heijmans, Singapore Contained Coronavirus. Could Other 
Countries Learn from Its Approach?, WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www 
.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/singapore-response-contained-coronavirus-covid19-outbreak/ 
[https://perma.cc/KG86-H7BU]; see Mary Ilyushina, How Russia Is Using Authoritarian 
Tech to Curb Coronavirus, CNN (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/29/europe 
/russia-coronavirus-authoritarian-tech-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/H3NT-C77X]. 
112 See Michelle Mark, The Coronavirus Has Caused a Full Breakdown in Iran, with an 
Unknown Death Toll, Infected Leaders, and Massive Burial Pits Visible from Space, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-coronavirus-covid19 
-deaths-cases-updates-2020-3.
113 Kim Hjelmgaard, Eric J. Lyman & Deirdre Shesgreen, This Is What China Did




114 Bill Bostock, China Declared Whistleblower Doctor Li Wenliang a ‘Martyr’
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During this time of crisis, states should cleave to their constitutional 
and human rights values not only for moral reasons but also for 
practical ones. It is understandable that governments, feeling 
particularly vulnerable, might seek to blunt criticism. Likewise, the 
public’s requests for information must seem, to many officials, like a 
particularly annoying or frivolous exercise given the major threats that 
they are facing. But critical reporting and public oversight are valuable 
tools to improving government administration and fostering public 
trust, both of which are needed now more than ever. 
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